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Abstract 
 
How to leak authoritative secrets in an elegant 
way? The paper aims to solve this problem. The 
desired security properties i.e. Semantic-Security; 
Recipient-Designation; Verification-Dependence; 
Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability; Public 
Signature-Verifiability; Recipient-Ambiguity; 
Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability; Public 
Recipient-Verifiability; Signer-Ambiguity; Signer-
Verifiability are specified in secret leakage. Based on 
Chow-Yiu-Hui’s ID-based ring signature scheme and 
techniques of zero-knowledge proof, an ID-based 
controlled secret leakage scheme is proposed. The 
proposed scheme satisfies all specified security 
properties and can be used in trust negotiation.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The most common definition of privacy is the one 
by Westin: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups 
and institutions to determine for themselves, when, 
how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others” [1]. According to Westin’s 
definition, individuals as well as groups and 
institutions have a right to privacy. In a fully 
networked society, privacy is seriously endangered and 
cannot be sufficiently protected by privacy legislation. 
Cryptography technologies now are valuable tools for 
privacy protection in addition to privacy legislation. 
We consider the following scenario of secret 
leakage [2]: If a police wants to arrest a criminal but 
knows few clues about him, so it promises to give an 
award to a person in some group who could provide 
the most important clue after the criminal is arrested. A 
group member Alice can provide something to a 
designated policeman Bob, but she is not sure whether 
her message could be the most important one. How to 
leak this clue in an elegant way? To protect the 
authoritative secret from propagating and anonymity of 
the member Alice and the policeman Bob, we propose 
controlled secret leakage scheme.  
Trust negotiation is now wide used in electronic 
commerce [3]. In order for strangers to conduct secure 
transactions, a sufficient level of mutual trust must be 
established. Trust negotiation is an approach to 
establishing trust between strangers through the 
exchange of authoritative secrets. Thus, controlled 
secret leakage scheme can be used in trust negotiation. 
Horster et al. first proposed an authenticated 
encryption scheme [4]. Authenticated encryption 
scheme aimed to achieve the purpose that the signature 
can only be verified by some specified recipients while 
keeping the message secret from the public.  
Rivest et al. introduced the notion of a ring 
signature in the paper “How to leak a secret” [5]. Ring 
signature makes it possible to specify a set of possible 
signers without revealing which member actually 
produced the signature. 
Lv et al. combined the two notations of ring 
signature and authenticated encryption together and 
obtained a new type of authenticated encryption, called 
ring authenticated encryption [2]. Ring authenticated 
encryption has the following security properties: 
semantic-security, recipient-designation, verification-
dependence, verification-convertibility, recipient-
ambiguity, recipient-verifiability, signer-ambiguity and 
signer-verifiability. In [2], Lv et al. also presented a 
ring authenticated encryption scheme based on discrete 
logarithm problem. In [6], Cao et al. found some 
weaknesses in Lv et al.’s scheme that Lv et al.’s 
scheme cannot achieve signer-verifiability and 
recipient-verifiability properties. Cao et al. also 
proposed an improved ring authenticated encryption 
scheme to eliminate these weaknesses.  
Identity based public key cryptography proposed by 
Shamir in 1984 [7] can simplify key management and 
remove the necessity of public key certificates. This is 
desirable, especially for these applications which 
involve a large number of public keys in each 
execution, such as ring signatures. In [8], based on 
Boneh and Frankliny’s ID-Based encryption scheme 
[9][10] and Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based ring signature 
scheme [11] Cao et al. construct an ID-based ring 
authenticated encryption scheme. 
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In 1985, Goldwasser et al. introduced the notion of 
zero-knowledge (ZK) proof [12]. A zero-knowledge 
proof is an interactive method for one party (the 
prover) to prove to another (the verifier) that a 
statement is true, without revealing anything other than 
the verity of the statement. An interactive proof usually 
takes the form of a challenge-response protocol, in 
which the prover and the verifier exchange messages 
and the verifier outputs either “accept” or “reject’ at 
the end of the protocol. Zero-knowledge proofs have 
the following properties: 
Completeness. The verifier always accepts the proof 
if the fact is true and both the prover and the verifier 
follow the protocol.  
Soundness. The verifier always rejects the proof if 
the fact is false, as long as the verifier follows the 
protocol.  
Zero-knowledgeness. The verifier learns nothing 
beyond the validity of the fact and cannot even later 
prove the fact to anyone else. 
In this paper, our main contribution is to specify 
security properties of secret leakage, define controlled 
secret leakage scheme to protect the secret from 
propagating and anonymity of the participants, design 
an ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme.  
 
2. Definitions 
 
2.1. Definition of controlled secret leakage 
scheme 
 
Definition 1: (Controlled secret leakage scheme). 
The controlled secret leakage scheme is specified by 
seven algorithms (protocols).  
Signature Generation: The algorithm takes as input 
message M, the recipient Bob’s public key, the signer 
Alice’s private key and all the ring members’ identity 
list L which includes the signer Alice, and outputs a 
ring signature S. The ring signature S will be published 
in Bulletin Board System (BBS) or send to the 
recipient Bob. We assume that anyone can intercept the 
signature S in transit. 
Message Recovery and Verification: The algorithm 
takes as input a signature S and the recipient Bob’s 
secret key, outputs the authenticated message M and 
returns 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information 
that the signature S is created by a ring member, 
respectively. We require that the algorithm outputs the 
authenticated message M and returns 1 if the ring 
signature S is generated by the signer honestly. 
Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring Signature: Zero-
knowledge proof of a ring signature is a method for the 
recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that the 
message M is signed by a ring member listed in the 
ring set L without revealing any other information. 
Zero-knowledge proof can control the secret leakage 
and prevent secret propagation. The algorithm takes as 
input a signature S, a message M, the verifier’s private 
key and a parameter ∆1 that can only be computed by 
the recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or 
reject the information that the signature S is really 
created by a ring member, respectively. We require 
that the algorithm l returns 1 if two parties do the 
protocol honestly. 
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: Zero-
knowledge proof of recipient is an interactive method 
for the recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that 
Bob is actually the designated recipient without 
revealing any other information. The algorithm takes 
as input a signature S, a message M, the verifier’s 
private key and a parameter Λ1 that can only be 
computed by the recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 
meaning accept or reject the information that the 
signature S is really sent to Bob, respectively. We 
require that the algorithm returns 1 if two parties do the 
protocol honestly. 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature: The 
algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M 
and a parameter ∆2 that can only be computed by the 
recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or 
reject the information that the signature S is really 
created by a ring member, respectively. We require 
that the algorithm returns 1 if Bob does the protocol 
honestly. 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: The 
algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M 
and a parameter Λ2 released by Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 
meaning accept or reject the information that the 
signature S is really sent to Bob, respectively. We 
require that the algorithm returns 1 if Bob is the real 
recipient. 
Signer Verification: The algorithm takes as input 
the signature S and a parameter Σ produced when Alice 
creates the signature, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning 
accept or reject the information that Alice is the actual 
signer, respectively. We require that the algorithm 
returns 1 if the signature S is really produced by Alice. 
The algorithm should satisfy the condition that only the 
actual signer Alice could provide such a parameter Σ 
that makes it equal 1 corresponding to the certain 
signature S and that will not release the signer’s private 
key. 
 
2.2. Security properties of controlled secret 
leakage scheme 
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Definition 2: (Security properties of controlled 
secret leakage scheme). A controlled secret leakage 
scheme has the following security properties. 
Semantic-Security: Any adversary cannot determine 
whether his guessed message is the actual message 
signed by the original signer, although he gets a valid 
signature. 
Recipient-Designation: Only the designated 
recipient can recover the message and verify the ring 
signature. 
Verification-Dependence: If the actual signer and 
the legal recipient do not reveal some parameters, any 
verifier cannot check the validity of the signature even 
though he gets the message and the corresponding 
signature. 
Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability: A 
designated verifier can be convinced that the message 
M is signed by a ring member listed in the ring set L by 
the actual signer or the legal recipient, but the 
designated verifier is unable to convince anyone else of 
this fact. 
Public Signature-Verifiability: Anyone can verify 
whether a ring signature is actually produced by at 
least one of the possible signers after the recipient 
reveals some parameters. 
Recipient-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot know to 
whom a signature is sent while verifying its validity 
except the actual signer and the legal recipient. 
Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability: A 
designated verifier can be convinced who is actually 
the designated recipient by the legal recipient, but the 
designated verifier is unable to convince anyone else of 
this fact. 
Public Recipient-Verifiability: Anyone can be 
convinced who is actually the designated recipient by 
the actual signer or the legal recipient. 
Signer-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot determine the 
identity of the actual signer in a ring of size r with 
probability greater than 1/r if the actual signer is 
unwilling to expose himself. 
Signer-Verifiability: The actual signer can prove to 
the recipient that it is he who actually signs the 
signature. 
 
3. ID-Based Controlled Secret Leakage 
Scheme 
 
Our scheme can be built from any bilinear map e: G1 
× G1 → G2 between two groups G1, G2 as long as 
BDHP in G1 is hard and the DDHP in G1 is easy. 
Setup: Let (G1, +) and (G2,•) denote cyclic groups 
of prime order q, let P be a generator of G1 and the 
bilinear pairing is given as e: G1×G1 → G2. Pick a 
random s ∈ Zq* and set Ppub = sP. Choose 
cryptographic hash function H: {0, 1}* → Zq*, H1: {0, 
1}*→G1*, H2: G2 →{0, 1}n, H3: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n→ Zq* 
and H4: {0, 1}n→{0, 1}n. Choose a pseudorandom 
generator F: {0, 1}n → G1. The message space is M = 
{0, 1}n. The master-key is s ∈ Zq*. 
Extract: For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}* the PKG 
computes QID = H1(ID) , and sets the private key dID to 
be dID = sQID where s is the master key. 
Signature Generation: Let IDi be a ring member’s 
identity, and 
iID
d be the private key associated with 
IDi for i = 0, 1, …, N − 1, where N is the measure of 
the anonymity set. Let L = {IDi: 0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1} be the 
set of identities. The real signer Alice’s identity IDAlice 
is ring member IDk listed in L. 
Step 1. To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}n, the signer, 
Alice say, who knows the identity IDBob of the recipient 
Bob, whose corresponding secret key is 
BobID
d . Using 
Boneh-Frankliny’s ID-based encryption scheme 
[9][10] Alice encrypts M under the public key IDBob. 
Compute 
BobID
Q = H1(IDBob) ∈ G1*, 
z Choose a random σ ∈{0, 1}n,  
z Set r = H3(σ; M),  
z Set the ciphertext of M to be <U, V, W>: U = 
rP, V = σ ⊕ 2 ( )Bob
r
IDH g and W = M ⊕ H4(σ) 
where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , Ppub) ∈ G2. 
Step 2. Choose a random r1 ∈ Zq*, and compute X = 
r1P, Y = 1
Bob
r
IDg and Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y).  
Step 3. To sign Z Alice utilizes Chow-Yiu-Hui’s ID-
based ring signature scheme [13]. 
z Choose a random seed A ∈ {0, 1}n, for i = k + 
1, …, N – 1, 0, 1, …, k − 1(i.e., the value of i 
all modulo N), compute Ai = F((A + i – k) mod 
N), and hi = H(Z, L, Ai). 
z Choose a random integer r’ ∈ Zq*, compute Ak 
= r’
kID
Q – ( )
ii i ID
i k
A hQ
≠
+∑ . 
z Compute hk = H(Z, L, Ak) and c = (hk + r’)
kID
d  
where 
k AliceID ID
d d= . 
z Choose a random r2 ∈ Zq*, and compute X1= 
r2P, Y1 = 2
Bob
r
IDg and c1 = c + H1(Y1). 
z Select 0 (i.e., N) as the glue value, the resulting 
ring signature S is the (N + 7)-tuple (L, U, V, 
W, X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1). 
Step 4. Finally, Alice sends S to the recipient Bob 
and keeps the seed A secret. An adversary can intercept 
S in this step. 
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Message Recovery and Verification: After receiving 
the signature S = (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1), 
the recipient Bob does the following. 
Step 1. If U ∉ G1* reject the signature. 
z Compute σ = V ⊕ H2(e(
BobID
d , U)). 
z Compute M = W ⊕ H4(σ) . 
z Set r = H3(σ, M). Test that U = rP. If not, reject 
the signature. 
Step 2. Compute Y = e(
BobID
d , X) and Z = H(U || V || 
W || M || X || Y). 
Step 3. Compute Y1 = e(
BobID
d ,X1) and c = c1 − 
H1(Y1). 
Step 4. The validity of the signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub, 
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A hQ
−
=
+∑ ) 
Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring Signature: If Bob 
(or the signer Alice) wants to prove to any designated 
verifier Carol that the message M is signed by a ring 
member listed in L without revealing any other 
information, they can do as follows. 
Step 1. Bob computes W1 = e(
CarolID
Q , c) and sends 
the message M, the parameter Y and the parameters (L, 
U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, W1) to Carol. 
Step 2. Carol computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || 
Y). Carol can be convinced that the message M is 
signed by a ring member listed in L if hi = H(Z, L, Ai) 
(0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1) and W1 = e(
CarolID
d , 
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A hQ
−
=
+∑ ). 
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: If Bob wants to 
prove to any designated verifier Carol that the 
signature S is actually sent to Bob without revealing 
any other information, they can do as follows: 
Step 1. Bob chooses a random nonce r3 ∈ {0, 1}n 
and computes W1 = e(
CarolID
Q , c). 
Step 2. Bob sends the message M, the nonce r3, the 
parameter Y and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, 
AN–1, W1) to Carol.  
Step 3. Carol computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || 
Y). Carol can be convinced that the message M is 
signed by a ring member listed in L if hi = H(Z, L, Ai) 
(0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1) and W1 = e(
CarolID
d , 
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A hQ
−
=
+∑ ). 
Otherwise, terminate the protocol. 
Step 4. Carol chooses random integers r4, r5, r6 ∈ 
Zq*, and computes T1 = r4P + r5X, U1 = r6
CarolID
Q , V1 = 
(r6 + H(r3, T1, U1))
CarolID
d . Carol sends (T1, U1, V1) to 
Bob. Here to sign (r3, T1) Carol utilizes Cha-Cheon’s 
ID-based signature scheme [14].  
Step 5. Bob checks the freshness of r3 and the 
validity of the signature of (r3, T1) by checking whether 
(P, Ppub, U1 + H(r3, T1, U1)
CarolID
Q , V1 ) is a valid 
Diffie-Hellman tuple. 
Step 6. Bob computes W2 = H(e(
BobID
d , T1)) and 
then sends W2 to Carol. 
Step 7: Carol checks whether W2 = H( 4
Bob
r
IDg · 5
rY ) 
where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , Ppub). Only if they hold does 
Carol accept that the signature is sent to Bob. 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature: If Bob 
(or the signer Alice) wants to prove to any verifier that 
the message M is signed by a ring member listed in L, 
they can do as follows. 
Step 1. Bob publishes the message M, the parameter 
Y and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c).  
Step 2. The verifier computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || 
X || Y). The validity of the ring signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub, 
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A hQ
−
=
+∑ ). 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: If Bob (or the 
signer Alice) wants to prove to any verifier that the 
signature S is actually sent to Bob, they can do as 
follows: 
Step 1. Bob publishes the message M, the parameter 
Y, σ and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c).   
Step 2. The verifier computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || 
X || Y). The validity of the ring signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ≤ i ≤ N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub, 
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A hQ
−
=
+∑ ). 
Otherwise, terminate the protocol.  
Step 3. The verifier does the following. 
z Compute 
BobID
Q = H1(IDBob), 
z Set r* = H3(σ; M),  
z Compute U* = r*P, V* = σ ⊕ *2 ( )Bob
r
IDH g and 
W* = M ⊕ H4(σ) where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , 
Ppub). 
Step 4: The verifier checks whether U* = U, V* = V, 
and W* = W. Only if they hold does the verifier accept 
that the signature is sent to Bob. 
Signer Verification: The actual signer Alice’s 
identity IDAlice is a ring member listed in L. If Alice is 
willing to prove to the recipient Bob that she actually 
leaked the message M, then she does the following. 
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Step 1. Bob verifies that the signature S = (L, U, V, 
W, X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1) is sent to him. The method is 
same as Message Recovery and Verification. 
Step 2. Alice sends the seed A and her identity IDAlice 
to Bob. 
Step 3. For i = k + 1, …, N – 1, 0, 1, …, k − 1, 
compute *iA  = F((A + i – k) mod N) and checks if 
*
iA = Ai. If they all hold, then Bob convinces that Alice 
is the real signer. Reject, otherwise. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we defined secret leakage scheme 
which consist of seven procedures to protect the secret 
from propagating and anonymity of the participants. 
We also specified ten security properties of secret 
leakage scheme. At last, based on Chow-Yiu-Hui’s ID-
based ring signature scheme and techniques of zero-
knowledge proof we construct an ID-based controlled 
secret leakage scheme. The proposed scheme satisfies 
all security properties. And can be used to establish 
trust in electronic commerce applications. 
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